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and thus the infrastructure growth rate, ceteris paribus. Veto points reduce political actors' sensitivity to
interest group demands in general and thus moderate the relationship between industrial interest group
pressure and the rate of infrastructure deployment.
Keywords
electricity, institutional environment, investment, regulation, interest group, state owned enterprise
Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations
Comments
Both authors contributed equally and list their names alphabetically on this joint work.
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/98
INTEREST GROUPS, VETO POINTS 
AND ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT 
 
 
 
Witold J. Henisz 
 
and 
 
Bennet A. Zelner 
 
 
 
 
 
WORD COUNT: 11,901 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this paper we examine the effects of interest group pressure and the structure of political 
institutions on infrastructure deployment by state-owned electric utilities in a panel of 78 
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 I. Introduction 
In this paper we investigate empirically the joint effects of interest group pressure and the 
veto points in a country’s formal political institutions on state-owned electric utilities’ 
infrastructure deployment rates. It is widely accepted that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) invest 
inefficiently relative to their private sector counterparts.1 A central reason for this inefficiency is 
the efforts of political actors, unconstrained by the market forces associated with ownership and 
control of private sector firms, to use SOEs as a vehicle for redistributing wealth to salient 
political constituencies such as concentrated geographic interests, labor unions and construction 
firms.2 Specifically, political actors may direct SOEs to undertake “white elephant” investment 
projects that provide targeted economic benefits to these constituencies, even when the aggregate 
economic benefits of such projects such as increased output or service quality do not cover the 
economic (opportunity) costs borne by the broader polity.3  
We examine how two elements of the political setting influence the extent to which 
political actors use SOEs to deliver targeted benefits: the political influence of industrial 
consumers of electricity, who bear the costs of white elephants without enjoying commensurate 
gains and can overcome collective action problems more easily than non-industrial consumers 
can; and the extent to which veto points in a nation’s formal political institutions raise the costs 
of policymaking, thereby moderating political actors’ sensitivity to interest group demands. Our 
analysis thus joins demand-side theories of policymaking—those focusing on interest group 
pressures—with supply-side theories—those emphasizing formal decision rules and structures.4 
The worldwide electricity sector prior to the early 1990s provides an appealing context in 
which to test our hypotheses. Infrastructure investment is inherently political as a result of the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Dyck (2001), Megginson and Netter (2001) and Vining and Boardman (1989). 
2 See, for example, Bertero and Rondi (2000), Chamberlin and Jackson (1987), Garrett and Lange (1995), 
Karp and Perloff (1995), Shleifer and Vishny (1994), and Willig (1994). 
3 See, for example, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996), Peltzman (1989) and Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva 
(1998). 
4 See Rodrik (1994) for a discussion of the need for a similar synthesis in the trade policy literature and 
Lohmann and O’Halloran (Lohmann and O'Halloran, 1994), Mansfield and Busch (1995) and Nollen and Quinn 
(1994) for empirical applications in this arena. See also Lohmann (1998) and Franzese (1999a) for applications in 
the realm of monetary policy. 
 large quasi-rents associated with generation assets, the widespread consumption of output, and 
the common belief that large scale economies create the potential for monopoly abuse by 
providers.5 Moreover, in the electricity sector, state ownership and operation was the norm in 
virtually every country prior to 1990, and it is well documented that political actors used SOEs to 
pursue redistributive objectives through white elephants and other means.6 These policies 
became so costly that they eventually led to severe financial crises at various state-owned electric 
utilities around the globe, particularly in developing countries.7 
We examine the infrastructure deployment patterns of state-owned electric utilities using 
a panel data set covering 78 countries during the period 1970 – 1994. Specifically, we assess the 
extent to which interest group pressures generated (and organized) by the industrial consumers of 
electricity combine with the level of veto points in the structure of a nation’s formal political 
institutions to influence the annual rate of deployment of electricity generating capacity, ceteris 
paribus.   
The results of our analysis are robust and strongly support our hypotheses. We find that 
an increase in industrial representation among the consumers of electricity reduces the rate of 
infrastructure deployment, ceteris paribus. As the level of veto points rises, the negative 
marginal effect of industrial representation declines in absolute magnitude because political 
actors are less sensitive to interest group demands. However, when industrial representation is 
negligible and political actors thus predisposed to cater to the demands of the pro-white elephant 
lobby, an increase in the level of veto points lowers the deployment rate by reducing political 
actors’ sensitivity to this lobby. 
 
 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Levy and Spiller (1994), Sidak and Spulber (1997), Spiller (1993) and Williamson 
(1976). 
6 See, for example, Levy and Spiller (1996), Savedoff and Spiller (1999), Soto (1999), and the World Bank 
(1995). 
7 See, for example, Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2000). 
 II. Conceptual Development 
The arguments that form the basis of our hypotheses derive from three main bodies of 
literature, those on: (1) the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, (2) interest group politics and 
(3) veto points.  
A. Inefficiency of State-owned Enterprises 
The literature on the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises begins with the assumption 
that political actors choose policies to maximize their political support. “White elephants”—
large-scale investment projects such as roads, ports, universities and power plants that directly 
benefit politically salient constituencies—are a particularly attractive vehicle for this purpose. 
These projects provide highly visible benefits stemming from increased employment8 to 
constituencies in the immediate regions in which they are built, as well as to national 
constituencies such as labor unions and the construction industry.9 Political actors may induce 
state-owned enterprises to undertake white elephant projects through their control of the 
budgetary process and appointment of key personnel.10 Because the criteria for building white 
elephants are largely political, however, many lack a strong efficiency rationale, and their 
concentrated political benefits come at a broader economic cost. 
The Electricity Sector.  In the electricity sector, many SOEs constructed plants whose 
investment or operating costs were too high to justify the economic benefits of the capacity that 
they added to the system. Such plants were built in uneconomic locations, such as a remote area 
far the sources of demand; relied on inappropriate technologies, such as a large coal-burning 
plant built where a smaller gas-fired plant would have been more economic; or were 
“goldplated” through the use of lavish materials and architectural designs.  
Although the precise costs of white elephants are difficult to measure, the limited 
evidence is suggestive. In the Argentine electricity generation sector, for example, unit 
investment costs fell from US $7,200 per kilowatt prior to privatization to US $1,930 
                                                 
8 In addition to providing direct benefits to those employed, regional employment produces a concentrated 
economic multiplier effect in the form of increased spending on locally available goods and services.   
9 See, for example, Cadot, Roller and Stephan (1999). 
10 See, for example, Baron (1991), Hird (1991) and Shepsle (1981). 
 afterwards.11 In Thailand and Argentina, the cumulative burden of state-owned electricity 
investment accounted for over one half of total foreign-denominated debt by 1990. These 
countries are not exceptions but rather constitute the most extreme cases in a broader pattern.12  
The greatest economic costs of white elephant policies, however, are those stemming 
from new plants whose output is superfluous or could have been more cheaply generated by 
improving the yield of existing capacity. For example, in 1989, Argentina had a capacity 
overhang of 45 percent, with over one-third of capacity typically under repair.13 In Hungary, 
thermal efficiency—the ratio of electric energy generated to the energy content of fuel 
consumed—averaged 31 percent during the 1980s,14 as compared to 35 – 38 percent for a well-
functioning gas turbine plant; in the Czech Republic, thermal efficiency was less than 25 percent 
at many plants.15 Available data on line losses, which reflect the fraction of electricity lost in 
transmission and are thus often used as a proxy for the quality and technical efficiency of a 
system, ranged as high as 30 percent in some cases and averaged around 14 percent among non-
OECD countries in Latin America and Asia during the 1980s, as compared to 6.9 percent in the 
more developed countries of the EU.  
More rigorous, corroborative evidence comes from studies demonstrating that the 
changes in management incentives that accompany privatization increase the efficiency of 
capital utilization. Several empirical studies compare the performance of SOEs with that of a 
matched set of private sector counterparts or with their post-privatization successors.16 La Porta 
and Lopez-de-Silanes compare output/labor and output/capital ratios for 218 Mexican firms 
before and after privatization, and conclude that privatization is associated with a 54.3 percent 
increase in output despite a decline in capital spending.17 Bertero and Rondi, taking a novel 
empirical approach, demonstrate the increased effect of financial leverage variables on 
                                                 
11 See Artana, Navajas and Urbiztondo (2001). 
12 See, for example, Bortolotti et. al. (2001), Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2000), Bourbakri and 
Cosset (1997), Dewenter and Malatesta (1998), D'Souza and Megginson (1999b) D'Souza and Megginson (1999a) 
and Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994). 
13 See Vecchia (1993). 
14 See Magyar Villamos Muvek (2000). 
15 See Newbery (1998). 
16 See the reviews provided by Vining and Boardman (1989) and Megginson and Netter (2001). 
17 La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999). 
 productive efficiency for Italian state-owned enterprises following the introduction of a new, 
more stringent corporate governance regime in 1987.18 Bortolotti et. al. find a 19 percent average 
increase in lines per employee after the privatization of 31 state-owned telecommunications 
companies.19  
Current Analysis. The current analysis adds to this body of evidence by examining the 
effects of differences in political—as opposed to market—incentives on SOEs’ deployment of 
white elephants. Following the existing literature on SOEs, we assume that political actors seek 
to maximize their support by providing policy benefits to constituents and effectively direct 
SOEs’ behavior through the appointment process and budgetary control. We do not observe 
political actors’ incentives or control mechanisms directly, but rather consider the effects of 
observable sources of political incentives—interest group pressure for more efficient SOE 
behavior—and constraints—the level of veto points in a nation’s formal political institutions—
on state-owned electric utilities’ generating capacity deployment rates.  
B. Interest Group Politics 
A substantial body of literature in political science20 and economics,21 which we 
collectively refer to as the “interest group politics literature,” emphasizes how distributional 
conflicts among interest groups affect policy outcomes. Consistent with the literature on state-
owned enterprises, this perspective views political actors as maximizing political support. 
However, rather than implicitly portray a specific set of interest groups—such as the 
beneficiaries of white elephants—as uniformly dominating political actors’ incentives, the 
interest group politics literature takes an explicitly symmetric view of interest groups’ role in the 
political process, emphasizing the relative strength of competing groups as shaping these 
incentives and thereby determining policy outcomes. More concentrated groups, whose members 
receive relatively higher per capita net benefits from favorable policies and suffer from a 
                                                 
18 Bertero and Rondi (2000). 
19 Bortolotti et. al. (2001). 
20 See, for example, Denzau and Munger (1986), Olson (1965) and Wilson (1980). 
21 See, for example, Peltzman (1976) and Stigler (1971). 
 relatively low incidence of free-riding, wield greater political influence than do members of less 
concentrated groups.22 
Antecedents.  Empirical support for the interest group politics perspective can be found in 
studies showing that larger and more profitable firms, which are argued to be more likely to 
overcome collective action problems, are more likely to lobby.23 Studies considering the 
incidence and success of lobbying behavior lend further support by demonstrating that the 
number and diversity of supporting coalitions (including their geographic dispersion) have a 
strong positive influence on the success of a non-market strategy.24 Other studies arrive at mixed 
conclusions, perhaps due in part to their failure to account for the institutional structure in which 
interest group pressure plays itself out, a critical issue that we address below.25 
Of particular interest in the current context is Milner and Yoffie’s examination of how 
interest group pressures on policymakers determine national trade policy. In her earlier work, 
Milner argues that despite the overall diffuseness of the benefits of free trade and the 
concentrated benefits of protectionism, we nonetheless observe free trade because of 
concentrated “export dynamic groups,” which receive a particular benefit from free trade and 
therefore work to overcome the collective actions problems that would otherwise hinder the 
formation and efficacy of a free trade lobby.26  
In their later work on strategic protectionism, Milner and Yoffie examine the 
circumstances in which certain industrial lobbies that were traditionally assumed to favor free 
trade shifted their position due to increasing scale economies, learning effects and foreign 
government intervention favoring competitors. They identify the conditions under which these 
lobbies succeeded in transforming government policy from free trade to strategic protectionism. 
One such condition is the extent of industry “segmentation”: the less fractionalized an industry, 
                                                 
22 Work focusing explicitly on non-market strategy develops more elaborate models of constituent 
competition in the political arena. See, for example, Snyder (1992), Baron (1994), Baron (1999) and Baron (2001).  
23 See, for example, Salamon and Sigfried (1977), Dickie (1984) and Masters and Keim (1986). 
24 See, for example, Esty and Caves (1983), Yoffie (1988) and Rehbein and Lenway (1994). 
25 Another reason may be the confound of reduced free-riding with industry collusion. See the discussion in 
Damania and Frederikkson (2000). 
26 Milner (1987) and Milner (1988). 
 the more likely it is to overcome its collective action problem and lobby aggressively for 
retaliatory strategic trade policy.27 
The Lobby for Discipline.  The industrial consumers of electricity play an analogous role 
in our analysis to that of the free trade lobby in Milner’s earlier work. We argue that, as a group, 
industrial consumers are better able to overcome the collective action problems that impede 
political organization of the broader, more loosely-knit group of electricity consumers incurring 
net costs from such projects, and therefore exert greater pressure on the government to exercise 
discipline in the deployment of white elephants.  
Industrial consumers receive a relatively small share of the benefits of white elephant 
projects but bear significant costs through taxes and higher prices, as the same populist motives 
that lead politicians to use SOEs as a vehicle for employment often lead them to create pricing 
cross-subsidies from industrial to non-industrial consumers.28 To be sure, industrial consumers 
might be willing to tolerate the direct financial burden of such redistributive policies as a feature 
of doing business in a given country. However, the burden of low supply reliability in state-
owned systems suffering from inadequate maintenance and repair—the implicit cost of white 
elephants—falls disproportionately on industrial consumers, whose operations typically depend 
heavily on a reliable and affordable electricity supply. These firms stand to suffer major 
economic losses from operational disruptions in the form of blackouts, brownouts and “dirty 
power.”  
Faced with such costs, industrial consumers exploit their political organizational 
advantages to exert concerted pressure on political actors for greater financial discipline of 
SOEs. These advantages follow from the relative concentration of industrial consumers as a 
group (the inverse of what Milner and Yoffie refer to as “segmentation”) and their possible pre-
existing affiliation with one another through industry associations and trade groups.29 Industrial 
                                                 
27 Milner and Yoffie (1989). 
28 Industrial consumers represent a more stable source of demand than do residential consumers and are 
consequently less costly to serve. Thus, higher industrial rates are prima facie evidence of cross-subsidization, and 
lower industrial rates may even reflect cross-subsidization if they do not fully reflect cost differentials. 
29  Industrial firms represent the quintessential organized interest group in the economic theory of 
regulation. In contrast to our analysis, Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976; 1989), addressing the US private 
ownership context, both conceive of producers exclusively as electric utilities, and “consumers” exclusively as 
unorganized, residential  interests. 
 consumers may also mobilize residential consumers who either do not live in a region benefiting 
from a white elephant or do not fully understand the cost that such projects impose on them.30 
Additionally, large industrial consumers may be able to threaten self-supply, further increasing 
their bargaining leverage and political influence. We therefore expect political actors to promote 
white elephants to a lesser degree as industrial representation rises, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 1. The rate of white elephant deployment (KWE) declines as the level of 
industrial representation (IR) in the consumer base rises, ceteris paribus. That is, 
0<∂
∂
IR
KWE . 
Figure 1 depicts hypothesis 1 graphically. The horizontal axis measures industrial representation 
in the consumer base as the fraction of electricity consumed by industrial users (IR), and the 
vertical axis depicts the rate of white elephant deployment (KWE) (i.e, the quantity of white 
elephant capacity deployed during the relevant time period, such as an annual budget cycle). The 
relationship between “industrial representation” and the rate of white elephant deployment is  
negative, ceteris paribus, as reflected by the downward slope of the schedule. 
The Lobby for White Elephants. The “dual” of Hypothesis 1 would posit a positive 
relationship between the political strength of the white elephant lobby and the rate of white 
elephant deployment. We propose no such hypothesis formally because various candidate 
measures of the former—such as the strength of labor unions and the construction industry—are 
not widely available enough for use in our empirical application below. It is important to 
recognize, however, that the lack of an explicit measure of the strength of the pro-white elephant 
lobby does not alter Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 concerns the marginal effect of the strength of 
the pro-discipline lobby on the rate of white elephant deployment (i.e., the effect of an increase 
in IR on KWE while all other influences are held constant), and not the “net” effect of the 
                                                 
30 Organized interest groups seeking self-serving policy changes often attempt to mobilize unaffected 
groups using a “collective action frame” (Benford and Snow, 2000) that facilitates negative interpretation of the 
status quo ante by appealing to pre-existing “cultural preoccupations and political biases” (Hilgartner and Bosk, 
1988: 63; McFarland, 1991). Research in social movement theory has examined the use of such frames in varied 
contexts, for example, national competitiveness frames used by interest groups seeking to influence standards for 
high definition television (Dowell, Swaminathan and Wade, 2002) and environmental justice frames in recycling 
policy (Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch, 2003). Zajac (1995), in his discussion of “fairness,” develops a related 
insight in a political-economic context, focusing especially on US utility regulation (Henisz and Zelner, 2004). 
  
 offsetting influences of the two competing lobbies.31 The slope of the deployment schedule 
Figure 1 reflects the marginal effect of IR.32 
Figure 1. Industrial Representation and White Elephant Deployment 
IR
KWE
0
 
 
C. Veto Points 
Interest group politics alone do not determine policy outcomes; rather, the formal 
institutional structure of the policymaking process may facilitate or impede interest groups’ 
                                                 
31 We nonetheless assume that the rate of white elephant deployment exceeds zero. This assumption is 
consistent with the conceptual and empirical research on the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, as well as a 
substantial amount of anecdotal evidence. It is also consistent with formal theoretical work in political economy (see 
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Peltzman, 1989; 
Shapiro and Willig, 1990; Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
The positive vertical location of the white elephant deployment schedule in Figure 1 reflects this 
assumption. If, contrary to the assumption, the net effect of interest group pressures were zero deployment of white 
elephants above some level of IR, the schedule would slope downward to the left of that value of IR, reach the 
horizontal axis at that value of IR and correspond to the horizontal axis to the right of it. 
32 In mathematical terms, Hypothesis 1 concerns the partial derivate of the rate of white elephant 
deployment with respect to the political strength of the pro-discipline lobby. 
 attainment of their preferred policy. This structure may influence the amount of pressure that 
different interest groups can exert on specific policymakers as well as the incentives and ability 
of these policymakers to respond to such pressure.  
Antecedents.  Our treatment of formal policymaking institutions is similar in spirit to that 
of Milner, who in a series of case studies examines how the pressure exerted by export groups 
favoring free trade combines with the voice and agenda-setting powers granted by formal 
policymaking institutions to influence trade policy.33 Our analysis differs, however, in its 
quantitative empirical orientation and emphasis on macro-level formal institutions. Specifically, 
we consider the influence of the level of veto points within a country’s legislative branch and 
among its legislative, executive and judicial branches on policy outcomes. Veto points have the 
first-order effect of moderating the response of political actors to interest group pressures. 
Moreover, the level of veto points can be meaningfully compared among the countries in our 
large-n empirical analysis, in contrast to the more qualitative, micro-level institutional attributes 
that Milner examines.34  
Scholars working in the field of positive political theory, especially in the area of 
“structure-induced equilibrium,” emphasize the importance of the veto points in formal 
policymaking structures. These scholars model how institutional veto points in the U.S. combine 
with politicians’ electoral preferences to affect policy outcomes.35 Under this view, an individual 
                                                 
33 Milner (1987). 
34 A country’s electoral system—e.g., proportional or plurality-based representation—is another broad 
institution that may influence the degree of political actors’ sensitivity to pressure from specific types of interest 
groups. The literatures on electoral rules and institutional influences on political corruption suggest that electoral 
institutions may affect the partisan structure and nature of competition among political actors, and therefore the 
extent to which such actors promote personalistic policies, as opposed to more nationalistic or party-centered ones 
(Carey and Shugart, 1995; Gaviria, et al., 1999; Myerson, 1993; Panizza, 2001; Rogowski and Kayser, 2002; 
Shugart, 1999; Wallack, 2003). Electoral rules may also affect the type of benefits that political actors deliver 
through such rules’ effect on party discipline (Ames, 1995; Bowler, Farrell and Katz, 1999; Carey and Shugart, 
1995; Reed, 1994). 
Although these literatures warrant discussion in the current conceptual context, they ultimately imply an 
indeterminate relationship between electoral institutions and white elephant deployment. As Kunicova and Rose-
Ackerman (2003) emphasize, systems that promote broad-based, politically-motivated public spending (both legal 
and illegal) tend not to promote geographically-targeted, politically-motivated public spending, and vice-versa.  Yet, 
as we discuss, political actors deploy white elephants both to benefit constituents in specific regions (through 
employment, for example) and also to benefit nationalistic interests (for example, the national construction lobby 
and labor unions). Thus, while electoral institutions may affect the deployment of white elephants, the direction of 
this relationship is unclear, and it is possible that no relationship will be observed empirically because the 
contravening effects of system type on geographically-targeted and nationalistic spending may offset each other. As 
discussed in Footnotes 55 and 60, we nonetheless test for the influence of electoral system type. 
35 See, for example, McNollGast (1987; 1989) and Weingast (1983). 
 or institutional actor’s possession of veto power over a final policy outcome is among the most 
important elements of institutional structure. Specifically, any single actor with authority to set 
policy behaves knowing that the final policy outcome must lie within a range of policies 
acceptable to all actors with veto power. To the extent that the preferences of the actors with veto 
power differ, institutional structures with more veto points limit the range of feasible policy 
choices. As a result, “the potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, 
the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion 
(similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these 
players.”36  
Several cross-national empirical studies linking national policy stability to a country’s 
number of veto points support these theoretical insights. Hallerberg and Basinger, for example, 
find that in response to the stimulus of the Reagan tax cuts enacted by the United States in the 
1980s, OECD countries with fewer de facto veto points lowered their tax rates by a greater 
amount than did countries with more veto points.37 Taking a more long-term view, Franzese and 
Treismann respectively find that countries with more veto points have more stable levels (either 
high or low) of government deficits and inflation.38 MacIntyre proposes a nonlinear relationship 
between veto points and policy responses to the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and reports 
supporting qualitative evidence.39  Tsebelis demonstrates that veto points limit the output of 
national legislatures, reduce the volatility of budget expenditures across line items, and are 
associated with greater independence of the judiciary and central bank.40 
Current analysis.  We concur that policymaking structures with more veto points reduce 
the degree to which political actors are sensitive to interest group pressures relative to structures 
with fewer veto points. Figure 2 extends Figure 1 by depicting the white elephant deployment 
schedule under high and low levels of veto points (with all else still held constant, including 
pressure from the white elephant lobby). Because an increase in pressure from the lobby favoring 
SOE discipline, as measured by IR, should have a smaller effect on political actors—and 
                                                 
36 Tsebelis (1995). 
37 Hallerberg and Basinger (1998). 
38 Franzese (1999b) and Treismann (2000). 
39 MacIntyre (2001). 
40 Tsebelis (2003). 
 therefore a smaller negative effect on the rate of white elephant deployment—when the level of 
veto points is higher, we expect the slope of the white elephant deployment schedule to decline 
as this level increases. That is, an increase in veto points (VP) reduces the magnitude of the 
negative effect that an increase in the strength of the pro-discipline lobby (measured by IR) has 
on the rate of white elephant deployment, ceteris paribus. However, in accordance with 
Hypothesis 1, in no case should the slope of the schedule become nonnegative.  
Hypothesis 2. As the level of institutional veto points in the policymaking process (VP) 
increases, the absolute magnitude of the negative relationship between industrial 
representation (IR) and the rate of white elephant deployment (KWE) declines, ceteris 
paribus. That is, 0WEK
VP IR
⎛ ∂ ⎞∂ <⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ . 
We do not propose a parallel hypothesis about the marginal effect of veto points on the 
sensitivity of political actors to the white elephant lobby (and thus the rate of infrastructure 
deployment) because we cannot directly test such a hypothesis as a result of the data limitations 
noted above. However, the relationship between the vertical intercepts of the white elephant 
deployment schedules is consistent with the proposition that the level of veto points conditions 
the influence of both lobbies on the rate of white elephant deployment in a symmetric manner. In 
Figure 2, pressure from the pro-white elephant lobby is held constant. The height of the vertical  
 Figure 2. Industrial Representation, Veto Points and White Elephant 
Deployment 
IR
KWE
0
VP = low
VP = high
VP rising
  
intercept of each white elephant schedule reflects the rate of deployment that the pro-white 
elephant lobby attains in the absence of a countervailing pro-discipline lobby, ceteris paribus. 
The vertical intercept of the white elephant deployment schedule reflecting a lower level of veto 
points (the one with the steeper negative slope) is greater than that of the deployment schedule 
reflecting a higher level of veto points (the one with the shallower negative slope). To wit, just as 
an increase in the level of veto points (VP) more greatly reduces the magnitude of the negative 
effect that an increase in the strength of the pro-discipline lobby (measured by IR) has on the rate 
of white elephant deployment, it also more greatly reduces the magnitude of the positive effect 
that an increase in the strength of the (unobserved) white elephant lobby has on the rate of white 
elephant deployment, ceteris paribus.41 
                                                 
41 Hypothesis 3 involves the special case often implicitly examined in the literature on the inefficiency of 
state-owned enterprises, in which political actors are predisposed to serve the pro-white elephant lobby. 
 Hypothesis 3. When IR = 0, an increase in the level of veto points reduces the rate of 
white elephant deployment (KWE), ceteris paribus. That is, .00 =< IRVP
KWE
δ
δ  
III.  Empirical Test 
We test the hypotheses developed above on a panel dataset covering up to 78 countries 
during the period 1970 – 1994. The unit of analysis is a country-year. The econometric 
specification to which the data are applied is derived from the following basic model of 
investment.  
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these variables, which we describe at greater length 
below. 
  Table I. Summary Statistics For Variables In Econometric Analysis 
Variable N Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
∆CAPACITYPC 1539 0.04 0.02 2.06 -0.37 0.12 
ln CAPACITYPC 1539 -15.03 -14.98 -11.98 -18.72 1.53 
IR 1539 0.49 0.50 0.92 0.06 0.16 
POLCON 1539 0.39 0.39 0.89 0.00 0.35 
ln CHECKS3 1341 1.27 1.39 2.83 0.00 0.51 
ln EXECCON 1507 1.62 1.95 2.08 0.69 0.54 
POLITY 1502 2.66 7.00 10.0 -10.0 7.81 
ln DEMANDPC 1539 -7.02 -6.92 -3.76 -12.42 1.69 
ln IMPORTRAT 1539 3.37 1.10 10.86 0.00 3.73 
CAPCOST 1539 0.04 0.03 0.25 0.00 0.03 
COMP_COAL 1539 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.24 
COMP_GAS 1539 0.12 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.22 
COMP_HYDRO 1539 0.41 0.34 1.00 0.00 0.34 
COMP_NUCLEAR 1539 0.04 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.12 
COMP_OIL 1539 0.28 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.29 
 
A. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the conceptual hypotheses that we advance above is a 
country’s rate of white elephant deployment. Empirically, it is not possible in a wide panel of 
countries to separate the deployment of white elephant capacity from that of economically 
“justifiable” deployment without subjectively assessing extremely detailed (and unavailable) 
data on investment costs and reserve ratios. However, we do not require such a measure to test 
our hypotheses. Rather, the marginal nature of these hypotheses, noted in their development 
above, permits us to use objective data on the annual growth rate of total SOE generating 
capacity (averaging 4.4 percent in the sample) for testing purposes.42 Our empirical model allows 
us to assess how political variables corresponding to those in our hypotheses increase or decrease 
the annual rate of infrastructure deployment when the economic determinants in our model are 
                                                 
42 It is important to understand that our model does not imply an assumption about the fraction of SOE 
generating capacity deployment comprised by white elephant deployment. 
 taken into account—i.e., at the margin. The operative question is, when economic determinants 
are taken into account, do the political variables have explanatory power, and if so, what are the 
direction and magnitude of their influence? Statistical insignificance of the political variables 
would refute our hypotheses, as would coefficients whose sign or relative magnitude were 
inconsistent with the hypotheses. 
B. Independent Variables 
 Industrial representation.  We measure industrial representation as the one-year lagged 
ratio of industrial to total electricity consumption (IR). Data used to construct this measure are 
reported by the International Energy Agency.43  
Veto points.  We measure the level of veto points affecting political actors (VP) in terms 
of the structure of a country’s formal political institutions and the extent of partisan 
heterogeneity within and among these institutions. We employ two veto point measures 
developed by Henisz and Beck et al., respectively.44  
The first step in the construction of Henisz’s Political Constraints Index (POLCON)45 is 
the identification of the number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and 
upper legislative chambers, judiciary and sub-federal institutions) with veto power over policy 
change in each country. Countries lacking any formal veto points are assigned a score of “0.” For 
all other countries, the majority preference of each of these branches and the status quo policy 
are then assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, one-dimensional 
policy space [0,1]. This assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of 
institutional constraints using a simple spatial model of political interaction. 
This initial measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment across 
branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive and legislative 
branches. Alignment across branches increases the feasibility of policy change, thereby reducing 
the level of political constraints. The measure is then further modified to capture the extent of 
                                                 
43 International Energy Agency (1999). 
44 Henisz (2000) and Beck et al. (2001). 
45 Data and codebook are available from http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/POLCON/ 
ContactInfo.html 
 preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch. Greater within-branch heterogeneity 
increases (decreases) the costs of overturning policy for aligned (opposed) branches. Possible 
scores for the final measure of political constraints range from zero (least constrained) to one 
(most constrained). 
Countries with the greatest level of veto points in the formal policymaking apparatus are 
those federal states with strong independent judiciaries and either presidential systems or 
proportional representation electoral rules that tend to yield coalition governments, such as the 
United States, Germany and Switzerland. Political constraints decrease as the number of veto 
players declines or as their preferences become more homogeneous, as is the case in moving to a 
mixed Parliamentary-Presidential system, typified by France or Brazil; to heavily fractionalized 
Parliamentary systems like those of Belgium, Israel and the Netherlands; to Westminster 
Parliamentary systems with winner-take-all districts, such as the United Kingdom’s. Non-
democratic countries and those with transitional political regimes have the lowest levels of 
political constraints because the formal institutional structures in these states provide tremendous 
discretion to policymakers.  
The measure developed by Beck et. al., known as CHECKS3, “counts the number of veto 
players in a political system, adjusting for whether these veto players are independent of each 
other, as determined by the level of electoral competitiveness in a system, their respective party 
affiliations, and the electoral rules.”46 The index yields a minimum score of 0 in the absence of 
an effective legislature. The score then increases linearly with the addition of subsequent veto 
points whose political preferences are closer to those of the opposition than they are to the 
average government preference based on a three-point scale calculated using a different 
methodology for Presidential and Parliamentary systems. 
For the former, the opposition is defined as the largest opposition party. The index’s 
value increases by one for each legislative chamber and for the president unless elections are 
held under closed lists and the president’s party is the largest government party in a particular 
chamber, in which case the president is not considered a check. For the latter, the opposition is 
defined as the three largest opposition parties. The index’s value increases by one for the prime 
                                                 
46 Beck et. al. (2001). 
 minister and for each party in the government coalition including that of the prime minister 
unless elections are held under closed lists. 
In our sample, CHECKS3 and POLCON are correlated at 0.65. The greatest divergence 
between the two measures is in their treatment of broad coalition governments. CHECKS3 treats 
each party as a veto player and thus indicates that countries such as India, Pakistan, Turkey and 
France have the highest level of veto points, while POLCON indicates that countries such as 
Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and the United States have the highest level of veto points.  
We estimate separate versions of our core regression using the one-year lagged values of 
POLCON and CHECKS3 as well as two additional measures of interest. The first is EXECCON, 
which is a subjective scoring of “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-
making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities… imposed by any 
‘accountability groups.’”47 Subjective scores such as EXECCON reflect perceptions of 
underlying institutional structures but lack a clear connection to the underlying characteristics of 
these structures. They are also more prone to coder bias than are more direct institutional 
measures. The correlation between EXECCON and POLCON is 0.63 and that between 
CHECKS3 and EXECCON is 0.74. 
In addition to these explicit veto points measures, we also employ the measure POLITY, a 
widely-used index of democracy also based on subjective coding. Even though this measure 
bears no explicit relation to institutional constraints, related studies have employed it in under the 
assumption that democracies exhibit more veto points than do autocracies.48 The correlation of 
POLITY with POLCON is 0.69; with CHECKS3, 0.79; and with EXECCON, 0.95. 
Consistent with prior literature, in our specifications using CHECKS3 and EXECCON, 
we take the natural logarithm of the variable because the distribution of raw levels is skewed to 
the left. 
Existing capacity level. The one-year lagged value of the existing level of capacity per 
capita (CAPACITYPC) reflects the effect of two influences on the rate of deployment. First, 
CAPACITYPC measures the economic demand for replacement stock, and should therefore be 
                                                 
47 Gurr (1990). 
48 See, for example, Barro (1996), Leblang (1997) and Rodrik (2000). 
 negatively correlated with the rate of new infrastructure deployment.49 Second, where existing 
capacity is low, political actors seeking to build white elephants are more easily able to assemble 
broader political support for the deployment of new infrastructure. Under a higher level of 
existing capacity, on the other hand, these political actors find it more difficult to assemble broad 
support because they can no longer as easily make the case for new capacity by appealing to the 
“common interest” of their colleagues.50 
As a result, we expect the negative influence of CAPACITYPC to be conditional on that 
of the political variables of central interest. As IR rises, the incentives that political actors face to 
exert discipline strengthen, implying that political actors will use a given increase in 
CAPACITYPC to argue for a greater amount of discipline, leading to a lower rate of deployment 
of new capacity. That is, the negative marginal effect of CAPACITYPC on the deployment rate 
should decline as IR rises. 
Similarly, the magnitude of the negative marginal effect of CAPACITYPC on the rate of 
deployment should also depend on the level of veto points that political actors face. A political 
actor’s arguments for discipline in the case of a given increase in CAPACITYPC are less likely to 
result in approval as the number and breadth of interests of the veto players among which 
agreement must occur grows. Thus, the magnitude of the negative effect of CAPACITYPC on the 
deployment rate should decline as VP increases. 
In our specification, we use the natural logarithm of CAPACITYPC because the 
distribution of the variable’s raw levels is skewed to the left. 
Demand. It is critical to control for the economic demand for new infrastructure. This 
demand derives from the expected future demand for electricity. However, actual forecasts of 
expected demand are unavailable for most countries and time periods, and in any case pose the 
issue of endogeneity in a model whose dependent variable is the rate of capacity deployment.   
                                                 
49 Oliner, Rudebusch and Sichel (1995), in a careful study of alternative empirical investment models, use 
existing capital stock in an analogous manner, as Lyon and Mayo (2000) do in an empirical study of electric 
generating capacity investment in the U.S. 
50 It is also possible that when existing capacity is low, the new infrastructure deployed is less likely to 
include white elephants. Because we do not directly observe the fraction of total capacity deployed comprising white 
elephants, we cannot directly test this explanation of the proposed negative effect of existing capacity. This 
possibility further suggests the importance of including CAPACITYPC among our independent variables. It does not, 
however, alter the interpretation of any observed (marginal) effects of the political variables of central interest. 
Additionally, our results turn put to be inconsistent with this explanation, as we discuss in footnote 62. 
 Following accelerator models of investment51 and econometric research on U.S. 
electricity investment,52 we use recent consumption, measured as the prior year’s end-user 
electricity consumption measured in kilowatt hours per capita (DEMANDPC), to proxy for the 
(unobservable) demand for infrastructure. Recent consumption is clearly exogenous to 
infrastructure deployment choices, and political actors observe this measure when making 
deployment choices. 
 Several previous cross-national studies focus exclusively on Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) as a proxy for demand (often without considering supply-side factors, political or 
otherwise).53 We therefore also examine a specification using lagged per capita GDP in place of 
DEMANDPC for consistency. In both cases, we use the natural logarithm of the variable rather 
its raw level because the distribution of the latter is skewed to the left. 
Financial Constraints. Ideally, our specification would include a direct measure of a 
country’s cost of capital to reflect differences in the monetary price of capacity expansion. 
Unfortunately, the data required to construct a comparable measure for state-owned enterprises 
in a panel of countries are not consistently available. We therefore proxy for a country’s cost of 
capital using lagged gross annual government capital spending as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product, measured in real U.S. dollars (CAPCOST). As this variable increases, 
reflecting a decline in the country’s cost of capital, we expect to observe a higher rate of capacity 
deployment.  
Constraints on government spending more broadly may also affect infrastructure 
deployment. Variables such as the level of the public sector budget deficit, public debt levels and 
the inflation rate could all increase the cost of infrastructure deployment and thereby reduce the 
rate of deployment, ceteris paribus. Unfortunately, the limited data available for each of these 
variables leads to a substantial loss in sample size. We therefore use CAPCOST as the primary 
measure in our core specification and conduct sensitivity tests by evaluating the impact of 
alternative measures in subsamples. 
                                                 
51 See Oliner, Rudebusch and Sichel (1995). 
52 Lyon and Mayo (2000). 
53 See, for example, Bhatia (1987) and Siddayao (1986). 
 Availability of Foreign Supplies. Some governments can buy electricity from abroad 
rather than generate it domestically.54 Our specification therefore includes the lagged ratio of 
imported electricity to total electricity consumed (IMPORTRAT). An alternative source of supply 
should negatively affect the generating capacity deployment level. In our specification, we use 
the natural logarithm of IMPORTRAT because the distribution of raw levels of the variable is 
skewed to the left. 
Composition of Domestic Supplies. The composition of a country or region’s generating 
capacity by technology type—i.e., nuclear, coal, oil, gas, hydroelectric and others—is influenced 
by the magnitude and frequency of daily and seasonal fluctuations in demand. In general, larger 
“baseload” generating units, with low unit costs and high start-up costs, more efficiently serve 
relatively stable demand; and smaller “peaking” units, which are more expensive to run but can 
also be taken on- and offline more easily, more efficiently serve uneven demand.  
Although differences in capacity composition should not affect total capacity in a steady-
state equilibrium, changes in composition may affect the total level of capacity during transition 
periods. A strong shift in daily or seasonal demand patterns, for example, might render it 
efficient to increase baseload capacity, while maintaining existing peaking capacity but keeping 
it idle most of the time. The phasing out of specific fuel subsidies could have a similar effect. In 
these cases, total capacity would rise during the transition period. A large change in the relative 
price of fuel used for a specific generating technology might have a similar effect by rendering 
the construction of new capacity of another type efficient while retaining existing capacity but 
keeping it idle.  
Data to measure such potential influences directly are unavailable. We therefore include 
as a proxy a vector of independent variables measuring the percentage of the prior year’s 
generating capacity stock for each major generating technology type (coal, gas, hydro, nuclear, 
oil and the omitted category of “other”).  
Country and Year Dummies.  Despite our attempt to include a comprehensive set of 
independent variables that systematically influence SOE infrastructure deployment, we do not 
possess a variable measuring the strength of a country’s pro-white elephant lobby. Throughout 
our conceptual discussion, we hold the strength (resulting from the level of political 
                                                 
54 For a similar argument applied in the U.S. context, see Lyon and Mayo (2000). 
 organization) of the white elephant lobby constant. As discussed above—especially in the 
development of Hypothesis 3—the strength of a country’s white elephant lobby acts as a “shift 
parameter” that increases or decreases the height of the vertical intercept in Figure 2.,The 
country and year dummy variables play an analogous role in our empirical model by effectively 
permitting the vertical intercept to vary by country and by year, thereby controlling for country-
level, time-invariant and sample-wide, inter-temporal differences in the white elephant lobby’s 
strength.  
In addition to reflecting the strength of the white elephant lobby, these dummy variables 
also reflect the influence of other potential sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In the case of 
the country dummies, country-level, time-invariant influences may include colonial legacies; 
socio-cultural divisions; the composition of output by sector as determined by natural resource 
endowments; and deployment costs, which may differ based on geography, wages, and the real 
cost of equipment. In the case of the year dummies, sample-wide, inter-temporal influences may 
include global trends in technological innovation and increased globalization itself.55 
C. Specification 
Our econometric specification is 
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55 As discussed in footnote 34, a country’s electoral system might influence policy choice, but there is no 
conceptual basis for hypothesizing about the direction of this effect on white elephants and it is possible that no such 
effect can be observed at all because the effects of electoral system type on the promotion of geographic and 
nationalistic interests may effectively offset each other. To the extent that a country’s electoral system type has a 
time-invariant observable effect on white elephant deployment, the country dummies should capture this effect as 
well. We also test our specification on subsamples of the dataset composed of countries with different types of 
electoral systems and report the results in footnote 60 below. 
 where the subscripts i and t are cross-sectional (country) and time period indices, the notation 
∆Xt represents the percentage change in the variable X between period t - 1 and period t, and lnX 
represents the natural logarithm of X. The variable names are those defined in the text above.  
The specification includes multiplicative interactions among CAPACITYPC, IR and VP. 
The inclusion of the interaction terms permits proper statistical evaluation of the conditional 
effects hypothesized above.56 The interaction between IR and VP flows directly from Hypotheses 
2 and 3. The interactions between CAPACITYPC and IR, and CAPACITYPC and VP, 
respectively, allow for the conditional effects suggested in the discussion of CAPACITYPC.57 
The three-way interaction terms reflect potential higher-order multiplicative effects given the 
hypothesized two-way effects among IR, VP and CAPACITYPC.  
 The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. Because the error term is 
expected to exhibit within-country serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, we employ a robust 
covariance matrix estimator in order to correct the standard errors. This covariance matrix 
estimator is consistent in the presence of within-unit serial correlation up to a specified lag and 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form, and also does not rely on an assumption that the different 
cross-sectional units share a common autocorrelation parameter.58  
                                                 
56 See Friedrich (1982) and Jaccard, Turisi and Wan (1990). 
57 It is important to recognize that the inclusion of interaction terms does not impose the conditional effects 
of interest on the empirical model, but rather permit their detection if they exist. Were no conditional effects present, 
the interaction terms would be statistically insignificant.  
58 The robust covariance matrix estimator is based on that developed by Newey and West (1987) for use in 
a time-series setting. The conventional Newey-West covariance matrix estimator is: 
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and X is the regressor matrix, xt is a vector representing row t of the regressor matrix, T is the number of time-series 
observations, K is the number of regressors, et is a consistent estimator of the disturbances, and L is the lag 
truncation (i.e., the maximum order of autocorrelation to which the estimator is robust).  
The panel version is a straightforward extension of the conventional time-series version. Under the 
assumption that the N cross-sectional units are independent, Sn is constructed for each unit n, and the resulting N 
values are then averaged to obtain a consistent estimator of S. See Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and Froot (1989). 
Thanks to Aart Kraay for sharing his insights on this topic. 
 We have also taken measures to ensure and demonstrate the robustness of our model. 
First, we use one-year lagged values of the independent variables in order to mitigate any 
remaining potential concerns about endogeneity. Second, our specification includes a broad 
range of possible determinants of the rate of capacity deployment among the independent 
variables as well as country and year dummies to reduce the possible incidence of systematic 
unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we test specifications including several other possible 
influences on the deployment rate, as described below.  
D. Results 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the core specification described above and 
several variants that we use to assess the results’ robustness. Column one reports results from the 
core specification using POLCON as the veto point measure (VP). Column two reports results 
from the core specification using POLCON as the veto point measure (VP) but without the 
interaction terms, in order to highlight the importance of the interaction between industrial 
representation and veto points. Columns three through five report results from the core 
specification using CHECKS3, EXECCON and POLITY, respectively, to measure VP. 
Consider the first column. With the exception of certain time period and country 
dummies (omitted from the table for brevity), the coefficient estimate for each variable or 
interaction term is individually significant at a p-value of 0.05 or less. However, the individual 
point estimates of the coefficients for IR and VP, the independent variables of primary interest, 
do not have a meaningful interpretation as a result of the interaction terms in the model. Rather, 
proper assessment of the effects of IR and VP (as well as CAPACITYPC) on the capacity growth 
rate (∆CAPACITYPC) depends on the respective estimators 
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and its standard error at different levels of VP59; and 
                                                 
59 For purposes of hypothesis testing, it is necessary to compute the standard error of ΒIR by employing the 
t-statistic: 
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and its standard error at different levels of IR. 
Table 3 reports estimates of ΒIR along with p-values when the existing capacity variable 
(CAPACITYPCt-1) is set to its sample mean value and VP set to different values, as well as 
estimates of ΒVP along with p-values when the existing capacity variable (CAPACITYPCt-1) is set 
to its sample mean value and IR set to different values. Figure 3 (the empirical analogue of 
Figure 1) illustrates the results graphically by plotting the predicted effect of industrial 
representation on the annual deployment rate when VP (measured by POLCON) is respectively 
set to its sample mean minus one standard deviation (0.04) and mean plus one standard deviation 
(0.74).  
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 Table 2. Point Estimates and P-values 
  Specification 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 
C  -1.34 0.04 -2.24 0.00 -1.41 0.03 -1.31 0.20 -1.69 0.00 
ln CAPACITYPC  -0.16 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.17 0.03 -0.19 0.00 
VP  -2.34 0.01 0.01 0.52 -0.80 0.01 -0.31 0.58 -0.05 0.33 
IR  -2.74 0.01 -0.19 0.04 -2.29 0.02 -2.66 0.13 -1.32 0.07 
VP*IR  4.95 0.00 1.67 0.01 1.06 0.25 0.15 0.07 
ln CAPACITYPC*VP  -0.14 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.66 -0.00 0.39 
ln CAPACITYPC*IR  -0.15 0.02 -0.12 0.04 -0.11 0.18 -0.07 0.13 
ln CAPACITYPC*VP*IR  0.31 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.31 0.01 0.08 
ln DEMANDPC  0.14 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 
ln IMPORTRAT  -0.24 0.00 -0.25 0.00 -0.28 0.02 -0.26 0.00 -0.25 0.00 
CAPCOST  0.36 0.05 0.31 0.09 0.23 0.20 0.31 0.08 0.35 0.05 
COMP_COAL  0.28 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.33 0.01 0.23 0.10 0.21 0.15 
COMP_GAS  0.38 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.42 0.00 0.32 0.02 0.33 0.03 
COMP_HYDRO  0.32 0.02 0.32 0.03 0.37 0.02 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.11 
COMP_NUCLEAR  0.29 0.02 0.24 0.05 0.28 0.02 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.26 
COMP_OIL  0.28 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.33 0.01 0.24 0.08 0.23 0.11 
     
N  1539 1539 1341 1507 1502 
Adjusted R-squared  0.221 0.213 0.217 0.220 0.225 
Log Likelihood  1495 1485 1344 1458 1469 
 
Notes: Estimated using one-year lagged values of independent variables. 
Coefficients for country and time dummies not reported.  
P-values (displayed to the right of the coefficient estimates in italics) based on panel implementation of 
Newey-West covariance matrix estimator. 
 
 Table 3. BIR and BVP 
  Specification 
  1 2 3 4 5 
VP at:     BIR 
Minimum  -0.48 0.00 -0.19 0.04 -0.44 0.00 -0.41 0.01 -0.44 0.00
Mean – 1SD  -0.45 0.00 -0.19 0.04 -0.39 0.00 -0.35 0.01 -0.39 0.00
Mean  -0.31 0.00 -0.19 0.04 -0.36 0.00 -0.27 0.01 -0.36 0.00
Mean + 1SD  -0.16 0.04 -0.19 0.04 -0.33 0.00 *  *  -0.33 0.00
Maximum  -0.11 0.21 -0.19 0.04 -0.26 0.01 -0.18 0.01 -0.26 0.01
IR at     BVP 
Minimum  -0.17 0.06 0.01 0.52 -0.03 0.18 -0.06 0.20 -0.03 0.18
Mean – 1SD  -0.06 0.23 0.01 0.52 -0.02 0.15 -0.02 0.44 -0.02 0.15
Mean  0.01 0.84 0.01 0.52 -0.01 0.24 0.00 0.85 -0.01 0.24
Mean + 1SD  0.07 0.04 0.01 0.52 0.00 0.94 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.94
Maximum  0.19 0.01 0.01 0.52 0.02 0.42 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.42
     
     
 
Notes: Estimated using one-year lagged values of independent variables. 
All independent variables other than IR and VP held at their sample mean. 
P-values (displayed to the right of the coefficient estimates in italics) based on panel implementation of 
Newey-West covariance matrix estimator. 
As described in the text, Columns 1 and 2 use POLCON as a measure of VP. Column 3 uses  
ln(CHECKS3+1), column 4 uses ln(EXECCON) and column 5 uses POLITY. 
*Mean plus one standard deviation is above the maximum observed value and thus not reported. 
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Notes:  Figure plotted using coefficient estimates from Specification 1.  
Existing capacity level is held at its sample mean. 
POLCON is used to measure VP and respectively set to its mean minus one standard deviation (0.04) and mean plus one standard deviation (0.74). 
 
VP = LOW 
VP = I
 Effects of IR and VP.  Consider the first column of Table 3. Hypothesis 1 states that the 
marginal effect of IR should be negative (regardless of the level of VP). Consistent with this 
hypothesis, the effect of IR on the rate of infrastructure deployment when VP (measured here by 
POLCON) takes any value from its sample minimum to sample maximum is negative, and has a 
p-value of 0.04 or less at all reported values of VP except for the sample maximum (at which 
p=0.21).  
Hypothesis 2 states that the marginal effect of IR should decline in absolute magnitude as 
VP increases. When VP is set to its sample mean minus one standard deviation (a low level of 
veto points), a one standard deviation increase in IR (0.16) yields a predicted decline in the 
infrastructure deployment rate of 7.2 percentage points (the slope coefficient of -0.45 multiplied 
by the increase in IR of 0.16), equal to 164 percent of the absolute value of the infrastructure 
deployment rate’s sample mean of 4.4 percentage points (or 58 percent of one standard deviation 
of the infrastructure deployment rate). When VP rises to its sample mean value (0.39), the effect 
of an increase in IR of one standard deviation (0.16) declines in absolute magnitude to a 
predicted reduction of 5.0 percentage points (the slope coefficient of -0.31 multiplied by the 
increase in IR of 0.16), equal to 136 percent of the absolute value of the infrastructure 
deployment rate’s sample mean (37.5 percent of one standard deviation). The negative marginal 
effect of pressure exerted by the lobby favoring discipline therefore declines in absolute 
magnitude as the level of veto points rises. Moreover, when the level of veto points reaches its 
sample maximum, this effect declines so much in absolute magnitude that is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero (p = 0.21). These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2: as the 
level of veto points imposed by formal institutional structures increases, the negative marginal 
influence of industrial consumers on infrastructure deployment declines.  
Hypothesis 3 addresses the effect of veto points (VP) when IR = 0. When IR takes its 
sample minimum value of 0.06, the marginal effect of VP is negative, with an estimated value of 
-0.17 and p-value of 0.06. When IR takes the out-of-sample value of zero, the implied marginal 
effect of VP is -0.18, suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in VP (0.35) would 
generate a predicted decrease in the infrastructure deployment rate of 6.3 percentage points, 
equal to 155 percent of the absolute value of the deployment rate’s sample mean (or 52 percent 
of one standard deviation). These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3: when political actors 
are predisposed to cater to the white elephant lobby’s demands for increased deployment, the 
 marginal effect of veto points (VP) —which reduce political actors’ sensitivity to interest group 
pressures—is a reduction in the deployment rate, ceteris paribus.   
Although we have not proposed a formal hypothesis about the effect of veto points (VP) 
on the rate of deployment at levels of industrial representation (IR) exceeding zero, the pattern of 
effects of VP at different values of IR is nonetheless informative. First consider the effect of an 
increase in VP when IR takes its sample mean value. This effect is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero (the estimate of 0.01 has a p-value 0.84). Thus, where there exists some intermediate 
level of industrial representation (IR) and the level of pressure to build white elephants is held 
constant, an increase in veto points (VP) has no observable effect on the rate of infrastructure 
deployment. The lack of an observable effect is consistent with the proposition that such an 
increase reduces the “sensitivity” of political actors to both the pro-white elephant and pro-
discipline lobbies. 
When industrial representation (IR) rises to its sample maximum value of 0.92, the 
estimated marginal effect of VP is 0.19 with a p-value of 0.01, implying that a one standard 
deviation increase in VP would now increase the predicted infrastructure deployment rate by 6.7 
percentage points. The marginal effect of veto points (VP)—which reduce political actors’ 
sensitivity to interest group pressures—becomes positive as the strength of the pro-discipline 
lobby, and thus the predisposition of political actors to cater to this lobby’s demands for reduced 
deployment, grows.60  
Existing Capacity. The remaining independent variables in the first column of Table 2 are 
all statistically significant. In order to gauge the effect of the existing capacity level 
                                                 
60 As discussed in footnote 55, we tested our specification on four subsamples, each comprised of countries 
with a specific type of electoral system. The estimates of BIR are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3 in 
all of the subsamples and attain statistical significance in many of the same cases. We attribute the loss of statistical 
significance in the other cases to the substantially smaller size of the subsamples relative to the entire sample (the 
subsamples range in size from 238 to 540 country-years), and thus the reduced statistical power of our tests.  
The estimates of BVP are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3 in three of the four subsamples 
and again attain statistical significance in many of the same cases. The subsample for which the estimates of BVP 
differ qualitatively from those for the main sample is comprised of countries with “mixed” systems in which 
different branches of government have fundamentally different types of electoral rules and furthermore consists of 
only 238 observations, so we have little confidence in the results for this subsample anyway.  
No discernible pattern emerges when we compare the estimates of BIR and BVP across the subsamples, nor 
would we expect one to, as discussed in footnote 55. The qualitative consistency of the estimated coefficients even 
from these small subsamples does, however, bolster our confidence that the estimates from our full sample do not 
reflect a spurious relationship involving electoral system type. We rely on the main sample for the analysis 
contained in the text because of the small size of the subsamples. 
 (CAPACITYPC), however, it is necessary to calculate BCAPACITYPC (analogous to BIR and BVP) 
because CAPACITYPC is the third variable included in the interaction terms.  When VP and IR 
are permitted to vary within one standard deviation around their sample mean, the total effect of 
existing capacity level ranges from -0.198 to -0.217, with a p-value of 0.008 or less. This effect 
persists in both sign and statistical significance over almost all feasible combinations of values of 
the three variables,61 and thus supports the conjecture advanced above that the deployment rate is 
inversely related to the existing capacity level.62 
Demand.  The coefficient estimate for DEMANDPC is significant and positively signed, 
indicating that countries with higher levels of electricity consumption build more capacity. It is 
informative to compare the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of these economic control 
variables to those of the political variables of theoretical interest. DEMANDPC is a central 
economic driver of infrastructure deployment; indeed, as noted above, several previous cross-
national studies employ a single measure of demand as their sole independent variable.  
In our specification, an increase in DEMANDPC of one standard deviation (1.69), 
increases the predicted rate of capacity deployment by 24 percentage points, or two standard 
deviations of the dependent variable. However, when industrial representation (IR) rises to one 
                                                 
61 Full results for this variable are available from the authors on request. 
62 Our results are consistent with the proposed “political” explanation of the effect of existing capacity 
level—that it facilitates political arguments for white elephants—and inconsistent with the proposition that a larger 
fraction of capacity deployed is composed of public goods when IR is low, as discussed in footnote 50. As we 
discuss in the text, a common symptom of electricity systems exploited largely for purposes of political patronage is 
a consistent lack of adequate maintenance and repair that leaves much existing capacity idle. Industrial consumers 
thus attempt to remedy the undersupply of electricity by asking political actors to direct the SOE to allocate more 
funding to maintenance and repair rather than new construction of any sort. If the political mechanism that we posit 
is operative—that political actors can better assemble a coalition supporting a white elephant when existing capacity 
is low then when it is high—we would expect the marginal effect of existing capacity (CAPACITYPC) to decline in 
absolute magnitude (but remain negative) as IR rises and political actors are less likely to make arguments for white 
elephants in the first place. In contrast, if a greater fraction of capacity deployed represents a “true” public good 
when existing capacity is lower, we would expect industrial consumers not to exercise discipline on the deployment 
rate when CAPACITYPC is low because in that case much (or most) new capacity would actually help to alleviate 
the system’s chronic lack of reliability. The sign of the coefficient on CAPACITYPC would then be positive at lower 
levels of IR and negative at higher levels. Alternatively, if the public goods mechanism were more weakly operative 
and the coefficient negative at all levels of IR, we would expect its absolute magnitude to grow rather than decline. 
As  noted in the text, the effect of CAPACITYPC is negative and statistically significant at all observed 
values of IR. Moreover, although we do not report them in detail, estimates of BCAPACITYPC actually decline in 
absolute magnitude as IR rises (from -0.217 at the sample minimum value of IR to -0.198 at the sample maximum 
value of IR). These results are consistent with the existence of the political mechanism that we posit. 
 
 standard deviation above its mean (the pro-discipline lobby is relatively strong) and the level of 
veto points (VP) declines to one standard deviation below its mean (political actors are relatively 
sensitive to interest group pressure), the predicted negative marginal effect of industrial 
representation on the rate of capacity deployment is -29 percentage points, which more than 
offsets the positive marginal effect of DEMANDPC to reduce the predicted rate of capacity 
deployment by five percentage points. In contrast, when IR declines to one standard deviation 
below its mean (a relatively weak pro-discipline lobby), the negative effect of industrial 
representation on the rate of capacity deployment (-0.45 * 0.33 = -15 percentage points) still 
reduces the predicted rate of infrastructure deployment, although is no longer larger in absolute 
magnitude than the positive marginal effect of demand, leading to a predicted net increase in the 
infrastructure deployment rate of 9 percentage points. 
Other independent variables.  Our measure of financial constraints, the capital budget of 
the central government (CAPCOST), is statistically significant and correctly signed, suggesting 
that countries with looser capital constraints build more capacity. In the sensitivity analysis 
below, we consider alternate measures of financial constraints.  
The ratio of imported electricity to total production is statistically significant with a p-
value of 0.00, suggesting that the availability of foreign supplies does, on average, dampen the 
demand for new domestic generation capacity.  
Alternative specifications and robustness. Tables 2 and 3 include results from several 
additional specifications. Column 2 of each table contains the results from a specification that 
does not include interaction terms. The effect of industrial representation is once again negative 
and statistically significant, in accordance with Hypothesis 1. Moreover, VP’s lack of statistical 
significance in this specification is consistent with Hypothesis 3: if the marginal effect of VP is 
negative where industrial representation (IR) is low and positive where IR is high, then the 
“average” marginal effect of VP—which is what Specification 2 reflects—might well be close to 
zero.  
The results in columns 3-5 are based on specifications that respectively use CHECKS3, 
EXECCON and POLITY as the veto point measure, respectively. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those in the first column with respect to the Hypotheses 1 and 2, although the effect of 
VP in Hypothesis 3 is no longer statistically significant except when IR takes a high value and 
EXECCON is used as a measure of VP. 
 Additional robustness tests revolve around including various additional and alternative 
economic influences in our set of independent variables.63 These include value added in 
manufacturing, industry and services; urban population percentage; population density; the 
credit/GDP ratio; and public sector deficit. In no case is the additional variable statistically 
significant, nor do the coefficients of central interest change substantially when one of the 
alternative variables is introduced into the analysis. Additional sensitivity analysis reveals that 
the reported results are not sensitive to influential data points, as the results are robust to the 
exclusion of outliers in the dependent variable and the independent variables of theoretical 
interest.64   
We also substitute lagged per capita GDP into our core specification as our measure of 
demand and obtain similar results. Finally, we estimate the core specification for subsamples of 
OECD and non-OECD countries, and obtain qualitatively similar results to those reported. 
IV. Discussion and Conclusion 
A higher level of industrial representation among the consumers of electricity mutes 
political actors’ incentives to satisfy the demands of concentrated geographic interests, labor 
unions and construction firms to build white elephants, reducing the rate of infrastructure 
deployment. Veto points that constrain political actors moderate the effect of interest group 
pressures in the hypothesized manner. 
Following recent work in the area of trade, monetary and fiscal policymaking, our results 
demonstrate the feasibility and importance of combining conceptual perspectives on interest 
group politics and veto points. Where veto points are high are prevalent, interest group pressures 
have a smaller effect on policy outcomes. The same level of interest group pressure may 
therefore translate into a different level of “success” in different states or jurisdictions, depending 
on the formal institutional structure. The analysis further demonstrates the feasibility of 
capturing international variation in sector-level interest group pressure using readily available 
economic data. 
                                                 
63 Results available from the authors on request. 
64 Observations are excluded based on the distribution of the relevant independent variable in the full 
sample. Removing outliers for the remaining independent variables does not change the reported results. 
 The effects that we find are statistically, economically and substantively important. 
Consider the case of Argentina as an example. As noted on page 8, prior research finds that the 
unit cost of investment fell from $7.2 million / MW to $1.9 million / MW after the introduction 
of market-oriented reforms to the electricity sector. This cost reduction translates into an annual 
average savings of $2.74 billion based on the average 517 MW of new capacity that Argentina 
deployed annually in out dataset. 
For purposes of comparison, suppose that Argentina had not undertaken privatization 
reforms, but that instead its level of industrial representation had increased from its 1994 value of 
41 percent to 57 percent (roughly equivalent to the level found in India and Portugal). Given 
Argentina’s current level of veto points (POLCON = 0.54), this increase in industrial 
representation would result in an annual reduction of 722 MW in the rate of generating capacity 
deployment, saving somewhere up to $5.2 billion annually (depending on whether the unit cost 
of infrastructure also declined. These calculations would change, of course, for a country with a 
different institutional environment.  For example, a one standard deviation increase in the level 
of veto points (as measured by POLCON) in Argentina’s policymaking institutions, to 
approximately the level of Belgium, would significantly reduce the savings associated with the 
increased level of industrial representation. In contrast, if the level of veto points fell by one 
standard deviation, to approximately the level of Paraguay, the effect of the increase in industrial 
representation would rise in magnitude 1,266 MW annually, saving up $9.1 billion annually.65 
Despite the strong empirical support for our hypotheses, we also note several limitations 
that warrant additional cross-national econometric work in this area. First, we are unable to 
measure the political organization of the “white elephant” lobby. Empirical contexts in which 
national policy debates are easily divisible into consumer versus producer interests, or pit one 
region against another, would aid in the further development of the empirical approach that we 
follow here. Second, our measure of interest group pressure for discipline on SOE infrastructure 
deployment does not reflect qualitative factors that may affect preferences about redistributive 
policies, such as dominant national beliefs about the role of the state, especially in the 
                                                 
65 We do not mean to imply that the additional cost savings generated by a substantial degradation of 
Argentina’s democracy would be welfare-enhancing, only that the substantive economic effect of changing 
industrial representation in Argentina over time could be comparable to that of the market-oriented reforms that 
have already occurred, but will depend upon the level of veto players. 
 infrastructure sector. Finally, our measure of institutional constraints does not take into account 
the structure of the regulatory apparatus or subnational variation in political and regulatory 
structures. Despite these limitations, we still derive robust results consistent with our hypotheses. 
Better measures should only increase the statistical and economic significance of related 
findings.  
Our ongoing research extends the study of interest group politics and veto players into the 
more recent period of electricity reform. We examine the timing of privatization and 
deregulation of the electricity sector as well as subsequent performance. The insights that we 
have developed here continue to shape this research agenda. Indeed, we believe that it is only 
possible to understand the dynamics of the policymaking process through joint consideration of 
factors discussed in different literatures that cross the disciplinary boundaries of public 
economics, interest group theories of politics and positive political economy. Failure to do so 
threatens omitted variable bias and potentially erroneous conclusions. Incorporating multiple 
policymaking influences better reflects the complexity that investors and political actors face as 
they interact on a day-to-day basis. 
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